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I wanted to provide to you our latest thinking (not for attribution) on Social Security
reform. I don’t need to tell you that this will be one of the most important conserva-
tive undertakings of modern times. If we succeed in reforming Social Security, it will
rank as one of the most significant conservative governing achievements ever....
Our strategy will probably include speeches early this month to establish an impor-
tant premise: the current system is heading for an iceberg. The notion that younger
workers will receive anything like the benefits they have been promised is fiction,
unless significant reforms are undertaken. We need to establish in the public mind a
key fiscal fact: right now we are on an unsustainable course. That reality needs to be
seared into the public consciousness. (Wall Street Journal 2005)
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Copyright © 2005 The Levy Economics InstituteFor seven decades, the far right has never veered from its
avowed mission to gut America’s most comprehensive,success-
ful, and popular safety net: Social Security. While it had won a
few small battles (most notably, the Greenspan Commission’s
huge 1983 payroll tax hikes and two-year increase in the nor-
mal retirement age), its efforts never gained much political
traction before 2000. Ironically, the Clinton administration
provided some much-needed support to the conservative think
tanks’ preposterous claim that Social Security faces financial
Armageddon. And candidate Al Gore’s only significant cam-
paign issue involved maintaining “lockboxes” to protect the
trust fund by dedicating a portion of projected 15-year budget
surpluses to the program.1
Those Clinton-era budget surpluses proved to possess a
half-life shorter than that of the latest American Idolrunner-up,
but the Democratic Party’s fib-and-flub may have done lasting
damage to public confidence in the program’s promises. Even
as Social Security’s supporters (rightly) object to the use of
the word “crisis” in neoconservative propaganda, Republicans
(rightly) remind us that President Clinton used the same word.
And given that the Clinton-Gore option of using budget sur-
pluses to “save”the program is now moot,there is little wonder
that the plan proposed by Bush’s 2001 President’s Commission
on Social Security Reform, which would include a partial pri-
vatization,has been resurrected.2 The neocons are quite literally
drooling with anticipation in recognition that they are closer
than they’ve ever been to realizing their dream of creating a
nation free of social safety nets,“one of the most significant con-
servative governing achievements ever,”as Peter Wehner oozed in
his not-for-attribution internal memo.
In truth,allobjective analyses show Social Security running
huge surpluses through 2018, which will continue to add to the
trust fund’s current assets of more than $1.5 trillion; indeed,
projected total program revenues will cover all promised bene-
fits for nearly four decades, after which the Social Security
trustees’ intermediate assumptions suppose that program rev-
enues will cover about three-quarters of promised benefits.
The White House has apparently enlisted its appointees at
the Social Security Administration in its efforts to put a nega-
tive spin on these numbers (Pear 2005).They have joined forces
with the neocons to talk about 10.5 or 11 trillions of dollars
of “unfunded obligations” through a fantastical infinite hori-
zon. However, as the actuary David Langer has long argued, the
assumptions used in those intermediate projections have con-
sistently proved to be overly pessimistic, and on more realistic
assumptions (what the trustees label low-cost or “optimistic”
assumptions—which have, in fact, proven to be spot-on over
the past decade),program revenues will be more than sufficient
to cover all promised benefits into the infinite future.
Leaving aside commentary on the usefulness of projecting
program costs and revenues through infinity (no nation yet has
ever persisted through infinite horizons), objective analysts
have come up with any number of small adjustments that
could eliminate even the trustees’ most pessimistic projections
of shortfalls. And while the neocons continually point to an
“avalanche” of baby-boomer retirements, simple math shows
that Social Security is fine long after most baby boomers are
dead and buried—indeed most of the projected shortfall occurs
after 2079.3 In truth, any future financial shortfall results from
the logic of assumed low economic growth, rising longevity,
and continuation of today’s low fertility rates—not from the
advertised baby-boomer bulge. Very small changes to any of
these variables produce huge changes to projections of pro-
gram finances carried through eternity.
The neocons nevertheless have provided President Bush
with a precise year for Armageddon: 2018, when payroll tax
revenues are expected to first fall short of Social Security ben-
efit payments. While it is widely recognized that interest
receipts and then trust fund bond sales will maintain program
solvency through 2042 (the independent Congressional Budget
Office says 2052), Social Security’s enemies argue that the pro-
gram faces a crisis by 2018,because its trust funds are a fiction.
As I’ve long argued, the trust funds cannot provide external
financing for one of the government’s own programs, because
this is a case of the government “owing itself.”At the same time,
however, this means that it is logically impossible for any one
of the government’s programs to face a financial crisis on its
own, because it is the overall budget that matters—not a single
program’s finances.
The neocons want to have it both ways at once: they argue
that because Social Security is a government program,it cannot
count as assets claims on the federal government, but at the
same time they claim that because Social Security’s finances are
separate from the rest of the budget,the program can singly face
its own financial crisis. Logically, if we are going to treat Social
Security’s finances as separate,then we must count its trust fund
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assets (Treasury debt) and interest earnings; in that case, it is
impossible to claim that the program will be bust in 2018—it
cannot face a shortfall before 2042 (or 2052).On the other hand,
if Social Security is a part of the federal budget, then it cannot
face insolvency unless the whole government goes bankrupt.
President Bush has willingly granted large tax reductions
that amount to a reduction of tax revenue over the foreseeable
future five times greater than the sum total of all the “red ink”
forecast in the Social Security program by its enemies. He has
done so while increasing military spending and creating pre-
scription drug benefits that alone are as large as the Social
Security shortfall. Indeed, the projections show that over the
next decade,excluding Social Security’s large surpluses,the rest
of the budget will run up trillions in red ink without causing
any alarm in Washington or financial markets.If governmental
red ink really is problematic, these relatively certain and near-
term trillions of deficits should weigh far more heavily on the
public consciousness than trillions in a long-distant and highly
uncertain future. In truth, a sovereign like the U.S. federal gov-
ernment cannot be forced into involuntary bankruptcy—a
point recognized by all major bond-rating agencies. And it is
not plausible to believe that either today’s or tomorrow’s poli-
cymakers will voluntarily default.
It would be easy to dismiss the current hysteria as much
ado about nothing. The Bush administration has floated the
idea of drastically cutting benefits in the far future, by elimi-
nating wage indexation, so that future benefits would increase
only at the rate of inflation. This would consign future retirees
to a living standard that would never rise in inflation-adjusted
terms.They would be able to buy only the basket of goods con-
sumed by today’s retirees; hence, their lifestyle would fall far-
ther and farther behind what in the future would be deemed an
“American” standard of living.4 Such an outcome would be
patently unfair and would be rejected by tomorrow’s voters.
Indeed, it is just plain silly to think that any “reform”legislated
today—whether it is tax increases or benefit cuts—will con-
strain policymakers in 2042 or 2052.
The neocons know this. Their only real hope is to disman-
tle Social Security completely and to substitute “privatization”
(under the cloak of the neocon slogan “ownership society”),
which would produce high management fees for Wall Street and
low returns for tomorrow’s seniors.5 With luck, this gutting of
Social Security would produce sufficient hostility to the program
that future voters would happily let the whole system die a
timely death.While no one has publicly painted such a scenario,
it certainly would qualify as the “most significant conservative
governing achievement ever.”
From the neocon perspective, this is a high-risk game,
because as poverty rates rise among tomorrow’s seniors owing
to the evisceration of the safety net,there could well be a revival
of New Deal fervor. The result could be a bigger and better ver-
sion of Social Security without the 1930s compromises, which
include the fiction that payroll taxes “pay for” the program; the
regressive nature of payroll taxes (with high wages and
unearned income exempt from the tax); the link between
income received while working and benefit payments—so that
the neediest seniors receive the lowest benefits; and the disin-
centives to hiring labor created by the employer portion of the
tax.If the neocons have thought about this at all,they must have
concluded that a bird in the hand is worth two in the Bush, so
to speak. In any case, the neocons do seem to be predisposed to
taking whatever gains they can get today while conceding to the
devil whatever he might take tomorrow. As my teacher the late
Hyman P. Minsky used to remark, the “friends” of free market
capitalism often turn out to be its worst enemies.
Rival numbers purporting to demonstrate either that Social
Security’s finances are doomed or that the program will be
sound for decades to come are going to be floated by the two (or
more) sides to this issue in coming months. The neocons are
betting that a well-financed campaign to obfuscate the issues
will succeed for the simple reason that voters will turn against
the program if they are sufficiently confused.And they are prob-
ably right—candidate Gore’s proposal to “save” Social Security
was so confusing that voters turned against him even though
polls consistently showed that the public trusted Democrats
more than Republicans on the subject of Social Security. Today,
the enemies (with substantial help from Clinton, organized
labor, and other Democrats) have successfully planted in the
public mind the belief that the program faces a “financial crisis”
at some point in the future. Supporters of the program proba-
bly will not succeed by playing a financial numbers game.
Is there a better way to protect the program?
Supporters of Social Security will have more success if they
ignore the fairly esoteric financial numbers and focus on the “real
burden” of providing for an aging population. Fundamentally,
this boils down to the projection that while we have threeworkers today “supporting” each beneficiary, that will fall to
only two workers sometime around mid-century. In real
terms, that would qualify as a “crisis” if two workers in, say,
2050 were not able to produce as much as three today. Two
questions follow from this. First, can we expect productivity
(output per worker) to rise enough over the next half-century
to ensure that two workers will, indeed, produce as much as
three today? All reasonable projections—including those of the
trustees—do suppose this. Indeed, over the past half-century,
productivities of workers in manufacturing have doubled or
tripled, depending on the industry—far more than what is
necessary to guarantee that we will have enough output in
2050 to raise the living standards of retirees, workers, and
other dependents.
Second, in the unlikely event that productivity does not
rise by the necessary amount, is there any purely financial
change we can make to the program, including privatization,
that will prevent a “crisis”? The answer is clearly no. Getting
more money into the hands of the elderly would—at best—
just mean that they would bid more of tomorrow’s produc-
tion away from workers and other dependents, leaving those
groups worse off.Unless privatization can increase birth rates
(or, god forbid, increase death rates—reducing longevity), it
cannot change the ratio of workers to program beneficiaries.
To be sure, potential remedies exist that could attenuate the
crisis by raising the ratio of workers to retirees (through
immigration, for example)—but privatization today is not
one of them. If worse comes to worse and we have fewer
workers per beneficiary and no increase in productivity,then in
2050 taxes will have to be raised (to reduce consumption by
workers) or benefits cut (to reduce consumption by retirees)—
or some combination of the two—but that is best left to voters
in 2050.
Of course, one of the arguments for privatization is that
it will somehow spur faster productivity growth. The favored
mechanism is through increased saving rates that supposedly
spur investment. This is wrong on too many levels to fully
address here.For starters,however,(1) conventional estimates
of increased growth attributed to additional saving are far too
low to make much difference; and (2) the Bush tax cuts and
Medicare drug benefits have added far more to long-term
projections of budget deficits than an unreformed Social
Security adds through the infinite horizon. Yet Congress
passed these measures with little concern for the impact of
“reduced” national saving on productivity growth. Again, all
this is so confused that it embarrasses one even to confront the
neocons with their own logic. In fact, budget deficits add to
nongovernmental sector savings and allow private sector–led
economic growth, a point rehearsed in many Levy Institute
strategic analyses and demonstrated again by actual U.S. eco-
nomic performance in recent years, yet seemingly beyond the
grasp of conventional wisdom.
Finally, if we really want to use government to try to
encourage saving, we can do that at no additional cost over
Bush’s privatization scheme and without dismantling Social
Security. The neocon privatizers admit that so-called “transi-
tional costs” could be as much as $2 trillion, as we phase in
private accounts while meeting commitments to retirees and
those soon to retire (Stevenson 2005). The neocons appear
perfectly willing to have the federal government borrow to
pay for the transition, on the argument that financial markets
prefer $2 trillion of deficits in the near future if this can elim-
inate the prospects of $10 trillion of deficits throughout eter-
nity—a bizarre claim. Putting that argument aside, if these
transitional deficits directly encouraged saving, and if this led
to faster economic growth by raising productivity, then
tomorrow’s burden on workers would be reduced. Rather
than using this $2 trillion of red ink to finance transition
costs, government could use it directly to subsidize voluntary
personal saving accounts—by matching dollar-for-dollar
deposits into approved financial instruments. This would
achieve the objective of the President’s Commission to
encourage savings and “ownership,”albeit without destroying
Social Security’s promise to provide a safety net for those
unlucky in work or investments.
However,if we really want to prepare for tomorrow’s sen-
iors by increasing investment and productive capacity, we
ought to do it directly, by putting into place the infrastruc-
ture that will be needed in an aging society: nursing homes
and other long-term care facilities, independent living com-
munities, aged-friendly public transportation systems, and
senior citizen centers. The private sector will play a role in all
of this, but there is also an important role to be played by
government—contrary to the wisdom of neocons,who believe
that the answer to any social problem is to reduce the size of
government.
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Notes
1. See Papadimitriou and Wray (1999) for a critical analysis
of the proposal to add budget surpluses to the trust fund.
2. See Wray (2001) for a critique.
3. Of the estimated $10.5–11 trillion shortfall over the infi-
nite horizon, just over $3.5 trillion accrues over the next
75 years. See Andrews (2005).
4. Today, Social Security benefits equal 42 percent of the
earnings of an average worker retiring at 65; eliminating
the wage indexation (but retaining price indexation) would
cause benefits to fall gradually to only 20 percent of pre-
retirement earnings. The worker retiring in 2075 would
receive only 54 percent of the benefits now promised by
law. See Weisman and Allen (2005).
5. There are many good refutations of the claims made by
privatizers that real returns on personal accounts would
reach 7 percent.For a recent analysis,see Krugman (2005),
who argues that the gross return would probably be about
3.8 percent while management fees would run 1.1 percent
(as they do in the British privatized system), reducing net
returns to only 2.7 percent—barely above the implicit
“return” in Social Security. Interestingly, many of those
advocating privatization now admit that privatization
alone cannot possibly resolve the “crisis”—which is why
they now focus on benefit cuts (such as elimination of
wage indexation).
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